ADR-061: Model access is released through revocation and operating evidence¶
Status¶
Superseded by ADR-068 (2026-10-05): the broker is parked and not supported for use; keyless-direct (ADR-064) is the only live model path. This record is kept as history of the parked implementation.
Proposed for #681, PLAT-202, 2026-09-06. Depends on ADR-059 and ADR-060.
Context¶
A working model response does not prove safe teardown, bounded cost, availability during an event, or recovery without resurrecting credentials. Google explicitly distinguishes deleting a service-account key from revoking tokens already minted from it. Direct-access migration must account for that residual authority, including shared-principal blast radius.
Decision¶
Treat allocation, participant capability, provider credential, request lease, and range lifecycle as separate state with explicit owners and correlations. Engine invalidation stops new admissions transactionally. Brokers check continuation leases at least every five seconds, use a two-second control timeout, and stop downstream delivery and upstream transport within ten seconds of committed revocation or loss of authorization service. These are qualification targets, not measured guarantees. Provider-side execution may continue; retain its maximum charge and report uncertainty.
Pause, reset, destroy, quarantine, ownership/participant revocation, expiry, and policy withdrawal all invalidate model access before reporting access withdrawal complete. Resume requires current admission and a fresh grant epoch, even if the underlying range generation did not change. Cleanup uses persisted original provider/secret references and cannot delete a successor.
Ship through disabled, synthetic validation, isolated canary, bounded cohort, legacy drain, and qualified operation. Rollback drains or disables model access; it never restores guest provider credentials. A database restore starts model admission disabled and must invalidate restored grant epochs, reconcile in-flight reservations, and issue fresh participant capabilities.
Keep prompts, completions, tool arguments/results, credentials, body hashes, and raw provider errors out of logs, audit, traces, crash dumps, and evidence exports. Engine commits a body-free decision/accounting audit record before dispatch; existing shared audit and protected external evidence remain the authorities. Provider logging/retention configuration needs explicit review; application body-free logging does not imply zero provider retention.
The operations design defines owners, failure responses, service objectives, sizing, retention, recovery, and acceptance evidence. GCP qualification feeds #2091. Cross-cloud qualification is tracked separately and cannot be inferred from GCP results.
Alternatives and consequences¶
Provider billing alerts and expiring guest keys are useful residual controls, but do not replace broker revocation or admission. Disabling a shared legacy service account may affect multiple ranges; migration inventory and an operator-visible cohort drain are required.
The design intentionally trades availability for authorization and bounded spend during datastore, control-service, and policy failures. Offline replay, background retries after ambiguous dispatch, and automatic credential-path fallback are unsupported. Separate accounting, broker availability, and upstream availability measurements make those outcomes visible.
Provider basis¶
Google key deletion semantics state that minted short-lived credentials survive key deletion; revocation can require disabling the principal. The implementation must measure the effective window for its actual credentials and policies. No universal provider revocation latency is asserted here.
M06 deployment enforcement¶
The GCP package supplies disabled Helm resources and chart-derived Actions artifacts, digest-bound release verification, drain settings and versioned TLS references. The GCP script quality lane installs the same pinned Helm binary to test the actual compatibility renderer. The operator probes distinguish local structural checks from the live IAM, LB/CNI and rotation evidence required by M10. Neither infrastructure provisioning nor a passing health probe qualifies model admission. The ADR remains proposed pending runtime qualification.
M06 review hardening binds control rollouts to the applied runtime ConfigMap, protects both authorization-path deployments with disruption budgets, and limits mounted ConfigMap payloads to 96 KiB before deployment. The combined Actions manifest excludes the broker from all incumbent platform egress policies regardless of generated resource names; dedicated policy owns DNS.
Self-review additionally binds both deploy adapters to current root readback, preserves the Actions Engine worker's runtime references on the control process, restarts control after secret synchronization, and uses foreground deletion to complete pod drain before withdrawing broker policy. Direct Helm input rejects non-private or malformed IPv4 coordinates and shared TLS names.